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RESPONSE TO "SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT
FUND LEGAL SERVICES? IF SO, WHAT SHOULD
THE LAWYERS DO?" BY JONATHAN A. WEISS
Michael Horowitz*

OPENING STATEMENT

John and I may be the luckiest members of our law school class of
all-stars-some of whom sit in the Cabinet, others in Congress, others as
law school deans, still others as corporate titans, with many wealthy
beyond the dreams of avarice. Whatever our classmates may be doing,
however, few have had the freedom that John and I enjoy to indulge our
consciences and to pursue our visions of principle and equity. As an
iconic figure who for more than 30 years has committed himself to helping the poor with devotion and profound integrity, John is the most
decent, the luckiest of us all.
As John would be the first to say, however, his selflessness and
personal integrity should not be sufficient to carry this afternoon's
debate. He would be the first to insist that his redistributionist vision for
the poor must be effective and serviceable, must stand the critical test of
whether it actually works. I know that he will likewise insist that the
Legal Services Corporation-to which he has devoted his career- must
prove its worth to the poor by means other than feel-good rhetoric.
I'm here this afternoon because I think that John's vision, although
held with honesty and integrity, has for the most part been strategically
mistaken. I believe that the reach of John's vision for the Legal Services
Corporation and the legal system-one broadly shared in law schools
and amongst legal elites-has badly exceeded its grasp. I believe that
what may fairly be called the Legal Services Corporation vision has
helped create a crisis of confidence in the legal profession that is broadly
and increasingly shared by the American people. I believe that the utopian character of this vision has-as ever with utopian visions-caused
its proponents to be tragically unaware of the negative effects they have
had on the very people they sought to assist. In establishing rights
*
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regimes, in seeking to constitutionalize public policy decision-making, in
its often undemocratic pursuits and in its often unrealistic assessments of
what lawyers are capable of achieving, the Legal Services Corporation
vision has often hurt and frequently devastated the poor.
Let's begin with the due process rights regime that the Legal Services Corporation has had considerable success establishing. Much of that
legal revolution-and it has been nothing short of that-has in my view
been based on patronizing views of the poor and their needs, based on a
sense that a caring elite of lawyers is needed to reduce the authority and
discretion of the local officials who run the public institutions on which
poor people and their communities are obliged to rely. In establishing
constitutional norms to govern decisions (ranging from suspensions and
expulsions from public schools to evictions from public housing, from
the rights of squeegee men to the manner in which police can patrol the
streets) the procedural due process rights regimes that John and his Legal
Services Corporation colleagues worked so hard to establish have transferred massive powers from local officials to lawyers and the courtsand have done so across a broad range of public policy fronts.
And with what results? While wealthy and middle class people
summarily evict next-door neighbors who play the piano too loud, it now
takes major efforts, often against great odds, before dope dealers and
violent sociopaths can be evicted from the public housing projects in
which the putative beneficiaries of the rights revolution live. (That
achieving the evictions requires reliance on habitually indifferent and
often less-than-competent Housing Authority lawyers further compounds
the problem faced by the law-abiding tenants whom Legal Services Corporation lawyers almost never represent.)
Our crowd of upper middle class types insists on summary suspensions of potential school troublemakers by the heads of the private
schools to which our kids go, even as the rights revolution has often
given near-tenured status to wildly disruptive children who profoundly
debase the learning environments of urban public schools. In the malls
in which upper middle class kids congregate, intense behavioral regulation takes place through private, contract-based codes of conduct issued
by shopkeepers and enforced by the security guards they employ. But,
conversely, thanks to rights regimes said to have been established by
Legal Services Corporation attorneys for poor people, cops walking the
beats of mean city streets risk personal liability lawsuits for merely asking menacing loiterers to identify themselves or move on. We rights
establishers get warm feelings in our bellies for establishing and constitutionalizing the rights of ghetto residents vis-e-vis the public institutions
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on which the poor have no choice but to rely precisely as we and our
families have fled from the very public institutions that we have
subordinated to lawyers, lawsuits and legal codes. We rights establishers
insist on defining the outer edges of permissible conduct in the communities in which we live through contract regimes that we establish by and
for ourselves. The highly legalized constitutional regimes we have
imposed on poor communities are regimes we wouldn't dream of living
under.
With such notable exceptions as saintly utopians like John Weiss
and cloistered men of integrity like Justice Brennan, a powerful measure
of hypocrisy has also animated much of the rights revolution. What Fred
Segal has called the "moral deregulation" of the rights revolution and
what Mary Ann Glendon has described as the "radical, personal individualism" that the rights revolution sought to enshrine as the preeminent
constitutional norm had its roots in 60's and 70's efforts of middle class
lawyers to loosen their felt bonds of Victorian constraints. Wanting
greater sexual freedom, greater cultural freedom, greater escape from our
grey-flannel-suit worlds, we "gifted" the poor with community institutions lacking in authority to restrict behavior and conduct. Of course,
we had private institutions, money, education, family and hard-wired,
internalized value systems that provided safety-net protection for us
when we "dropped out" to challenge prevailing values or public authorities. Moreover, the "challenges" that our dropouts posed to the prevailing values of our communities generally took the form of louder and
looser clothes, home drug use and consensual sex. The poor, on the
other hand, in whose name the rights revolution was "won," had nothing
to turn to when our anti-communitarian, asocial revolution turned mean
for them-as it did in spades. America's poor people in distress were
left with us-the very lawyers who had undermined the viability of their
schools, homes and neighborhoods, the very change agents who had
turned local officials into limited-authority, risk-averse figures lacking in
any real capacity to exercise community leadership.
When I was a member of the Reagan Administration, I met with the
handful of ghetto school principals who were actually producing firstrate educations for their students-and were doing so without baseball
bats or resorting to violence. They were extraordinary men and women
who had magically rescued seemingly hopeless institutions and turned
them into effective places of learning. I remember one of the principals
who, at a meeting with President Reagan, profusely thanked him for raising the school discipline issue as a matter of serious national concern.
(The thanks were much deserved, for President Reagan had been
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viciously attacked as indifferent to poor urban children, as seeking to
distract attention from the need to give more federal dollars to public
schools, when he raised the school discipline issue.) The principal said:
"You could have poured a billion dollars into my school when I took it
over, and it would have been like pouring money down a rat hole. But I
instituted dress codes, suspended kids for not doing homework, insisted
that behavioral standards be met. Now I've got long waiting lists of kids
trying to get into my school, high proportions of kids graduating, high
proportions going on to college." He asked the President: "Want to
know why I succeeded?" After the President allowed that he did, the
principal responded: "The secret to my success was that the Legal Services lawyers never found out what I was doing while I implementing
student codes of conduct that violated all sorts of laws and rules, when I
disciplined and suspended disruptive kids." And then he said: "Mr.
President the lawyers now know what I'm doing but are not suing me.
Do you want to know why?" The President said that he did, and the
principal answered: "Because my community would lynch them if they
dared to try." At that remark, twenty or so principals sitting in the White
House Cabinet Room, probably the most heroic group of men and
women I'll ever be in the same place with, broke into spontaneous
applause. There you have it. Heroes educating young ghetto children
against all odds, thinking of the Legal Services Corporation, the lawyers
and the legal system as principal adversaries, as enemies of the discretion
and authority they needed to do right by ghetto students.
Many other stories of this sort can be told. Frank Keating, now the
Governor of Oklahoma, was General Counsel of HUD when he told me
of a visit he and then-Secretary Kemp paid to a public housing project.
At the show-and-tell session conducted for them by residents of the project, they were told that a team of the biggest, strongest, toughest residents had been created to pay late-night visits to the apartments of known
troublemakers and to demand that they clear out of their apartments
"before the sun rose." The residents completed their report to Governor
Keating and Secretary Kemp by proudly telling them that the troublemakers were now gone, that their project had become a nice place in
which to live. Imagine! Good people forced to become vigilantes and
vigilantes thinking themselves as heroes, because the law had become so
Dickensian, so blind and hostile to real-world needs and effects, so much
tougher on vulnerable poor people than on those who preyed on them, so
much a process of utopian abstraction to the comfortable lawyers and
judges who created laws that governed everyone but themselves.
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There's a second element to the revolutions wrought and the further
revolutions sought to be wrought by John and his Legal Services Corporation colleagues. In addition to its disempowerment of local community
officials, and replacing them with our distant selves as the community's
real decision makers, the legal revolutionaries sought and seek to use the
courts as engines of massive public spending and massive income redistribution. Their belief in this regard was articulated by one of the speakers at today's conference who commented that the problem with the poor
in America is that they don't have enough money. That "cute" comment,
that trite reductionist view has been an animating belief of the legal
rights revolutionaries-and it couldn't possibly be more wrong. I can't
imagine a more simplistic, tragic view of the needs of the poor than that
statement, and yet it nicely captures another real agenda of John and his
colleagues-the effort to use the legal/litigation system to achieve nondemocratic, legal/constitutional mandates to entitlement-based income
redistribution. The same people who see in the Constitution a government not powerful enough to let a public school principal suspend a menacing and disruptive kid see in the same Constitution a government with
the power to massively redistribute income, to decide who gets how
much money, to ensure income transfers divorced from and unrelated to
work.
If government monies and income transfers were capable of solving
the problems of the poor, America would be a utopia by now, and poverty would long since have been on the way out if not abolished. In
fact-as I can tell you from my experience as General Counsel of the
Office of Management and Budget-a generous, caring America has
spent more than five trillion dollars-that's five trillion dollars-on the
poor during the past few decades. Such a sum-five thousand billion
dollars-is a literally incomprehensible quantum of resources. Yet during the very period when government expenditures for the poor increased
by orders of magnitude, and then some, the bleakness and meanness of
life for American ghetto residents likewise increased. Whether social
pathology is measured in terms of crime or male participation in the
workforce or underclass growth or diminished public school performance, John's income-transfer, value-neutral, resource-based vision has
grown hand in hand with tragedy and decline and hopelessness in our
poorest communities. Thank heavens that the ultimate vision of John
and Charlie Reich and Justice Brennan-their hope of establishing substantive due process rights to income transfers and welfare entitlements-has not been enshrined in the Constitution, has not been
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immunized from such democratic adjustments as welfare reform and
Social Security reform legislation.
The high watermark of John's vision was Justice Brennan's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly. William Brennan, a great man, the most powerful legal figure of the century, a man whose personal integrity matched
John's (an integrity not always matched by their comrades in arms)
viewed Goldberg as his favorite, his most important decision. Goldberg,
a paean to the virtues of welfare, a constitutional pronouncement that the
poor were passive victims with highly limited capacity to alter their fates,
was itself based on the most cited and influential law review article of
the century, Charlie Reich's The New Property. According to Reich, and
to John and Goldberg, economies are zero-sum processes characterized
by government rules that give unearned wealth to the haves and deny it
to the have-nots. If, as Charlie Reich believed, most private wealth
came from government-dispensed licenses and subsidies, it only seemed
fair to see in the Constitution a comparable right of the poor to get their
slice of the government-baked pie. At a minimum, said Goldberg, if we
can't directly create substantive due process entitlements to welfare, let's
at least create procedural due process rights that can make it difficult if
not effectively impossible to take welfare away once it has been given.
The Goldberg procedural due process mandates swiftly became the basis
of student and tenant and street vagrant rights and a raft of other decisions protecting disruptive behavioral conduct. It was thus from
Goldberg that the dual Legal Services Corporation vision flowed - the
vision of a government that couldn't enforce norms of conduct but was
constitutionally required to transfer wealth from those who worked and
followed the rules to those who often didn't.
An important part of the above vision was a sort of economic illiteracy that failed to understand the dynamic nature of economies and
wealth creation, that failed miserably to understand the productive effects
of positive economic incentives and the devastating effects of perverse
ones. It was a form of economic illiteracy that assumed that wealth
could be created and sustained by the stroke of a judge's pen, or that of
any public official. How else to explain the fact that the bulk of John's
30 years of service have not simply been to the poor, but to the elderly
poor, to whom, in the name of "justice," John would redistribute even
more of society's scarce resources? In fact, among the greatest threats
America now faces is the fact that too much money goes to and has been
promised to the elderly. Unearned Social Security benefits and other elderly entitlements are ticking A-bombs that, unless modified, can undermine our children's prospects, compromise the overall ability of society

1999]

RESPONSE

to provide resources for health and education, and even significantly
reduce society's ability to support safety net protection for the poor.
John not only wants to protect current income entitlements of the elderly,
but to increase and expand them. Has the Constitution he purports to
construe ever met the budget that democratically elected officials now
struggle with? Have Legal Services visionaries fighting for higher and
higher public school budgets ever checked out the dramatic increases in
those budgets that have occurred over the past few decades, and have
they noted the lack of meaningful correlation between dollars given to
urban public school systems and their actual performance?
Two final points. The Legal Services Corporation vision that John
believes in has not only not worked. Its undemocratic practice of resorting to the courts to undermine value systems and to redistribute resources
has created a crisis of confidence in legal institutions, if not the rule of
law itself, on the part of the American people. When John and I graduated from law school, we assumed that our licenses would automatically
translate to leadership roles in American life. This was because, as Tocqueville had written and as Lincoln had lived and practiced, lawyers
were seen as helping agents of people who had serious disputes with
others. John's anti-democratic vision-his belief in "public" law rather
than merely "private" law-often consists of "big case" representations
in which clients are the means by which lawyers become free to use their
monopoly of access to the courts to advocate their visions of social justice. In today's world-where lawyers use clients rather than visa versa,
where clients are the means rather than the ends of the legal processmost Americans and their institutions flee from our leadership and influence. Economists with sensible cost-benefit disciplines are rapidly
replacing lawyers with utopian "rights" visions as our key public policy
makers. This is not altogether good or in society's interest, but our overreach, our blindness, our utopian pretensions have brought all this on
ourselves. It's our fault that today's law school graduates are increasingly thought of as necessary evils-as is perhaps even the very notion
of the rule of law. To the extent that is so, the last three decades of Legal
Services Corporation visions and resolutions, and their accompanying
law school activism has much to answer for.
Finally, it's not accidental that the most vibrant, dynamic, democratic and productive component of American society-the American
middle class, which most poor people aspire to join-are the ones least
represented by lawyers. The American middle class makes its own mistakes and suffers its share of injustices, and somehow learns to live with
them and move on. To be sure, there are times in many settings when we
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all need lawyers, but the worst thing I can imagine would be to extend to
the middle class the same right to counsel, with all of its perverse sideeffects, that John ever-more widely seeks for the poor. We lawyers are
important components of the justice system but, contrary to John's view,
more of us and more power to us doesn't automatically translate to
greater justice for all. As I look at a legal system and its lawyers who are
viewed with increasing alarm by an American public that once profited
from placing us at the center of its community and political institutionsas I look at an American society that does without us whenever it can
and looks for ways to do without us yet more-I don't think of Americans as dumb or uncaring of others. I see America sending a wise signal
to lawyers that bids us to look at ourselves and our excesses, to
subordinate our visions of the good to the more limited objectives generally sought by our clients, to trust our democratic institutions more than
ourselves as the agents most capable of bringing liberty and justice for
all.
FIRST COMMENT

First, John, maybe you didn't hear. The heads of local community
housing projects and the tenants they brought with them, the public
school parents who came to us, were telling us that Legal Services Corporation lawyers were representing interests contrary and indeed hostile
to theirs. Those forgotten clients had the same interests my kids haveto get troublemaking students suspended and disciplined and, if need be,
to learn and profit from being the objects of (often imperfect) discipline.
These people were not faceless bureaucrats but heroic principals who had
moved their schools from the wasteland conditions that most ghetto
schools still are in. They were kids whose parents were unable to afford
the school choice exercised by wealthy and middle-class Americans, kids
who were stuck in the schools to which the educational bureaucracies
had assigned them, kids who, against all odds, wanted meaningful high
school degrees and rigorous academic programs and access to college.
They saw in such educations the means of escape from poverty, and they
often saw lawyers like us as their enemies.
As you talk, John, about the wisdom of not trusting anyone and
about the need to ensure that no one becomes God, I don't think you
realize that as we lawyers protect others from imperfect Gods, that we
assume that very role. And inefficient and distant Gods we are-offerors
of dollars and abstract rules who are generally clueless about the
dynamic natures of the communities we "help" and judge. I lived in
Mississippi in the late 60's as a civil rights law professor and saw the
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rule of law at its best, as it took on the thugs who sought to use segregationist laws to maintain an artificial caste system, who sought to use it as
a barrier to social change. Only a lawyer, with the skewed talent we
have to extend truth by analogy well past the point of diminishing return,
with the capacity our training often gives us to elevate volumes of logic
over pages of history, could analogize the great battle of Brown v. Board
of Education to an effort to give squeegee men the right to menace
motorists and their companion right to a permanent, publicly-funded
income. Our hypocrisy should again be noted-we tell ourselves that the
rights regimes we produce truly help the urban poor, and do so as we roll
up our windows and drive to the suburbs in which we live.
As to Boeing, you've given us another example of reasoning by
logic and analogy that extends beyond the point of common sense. The
real analogy I see for poor people, John, is with middle class people
whom they aspire to join, not to Boeing, an inanimate creature of legal
fiction which no poor person can ever "become." I'm for giving the poor
the same equivalence under the law that middle-class people have-not
total but considerable freedom from the saving ministrations of lawyers-this so that poor children can more easily go to good schools,
more often live in orderly communities, more fully learn the value of
personal achievement and the price of failing to seek it. I'm for this
golden rule principle: Let's not establish legal regimes for the poor that
we wouldn't dream of living under ourselves. This, I think, is the critical
first step in creating legal regimes that actually help poor people.
SECOND COMMENT

Your point and argument is a good one, John-if poor people are
actually like Boeing. If they are, I would agree with you that every poor
person ought to have the right to as many lawyers as does each Fortune
500 company. (For the record, I agree with you that many corporations
receive unjustifiable government subsidies, and I have fought to eliminate them from federal budgets through political debate and effort.)
Your Boeing analogy, John, makes it clear that you think of poor people
in the aggregate, as if they were corporations-as if they were undifferentiated cohorts of people on whose behalf great lawyers should be battling for great rights. I think of poor people on a retail basis. I also think
that lawyers earned America's trust and respect when we represented
people on a retail basis, one at a time.
Quite by accident-surely not because of anything anyone taught
me at Yale Law School-I've spent the bulk of my legal career representing individual middle-class citizens. You think of the poor as a mass
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cohort, as a political interest group, just like Boeing is. I think of poor
people as I did my middle-class clients-cops, firemen, people in difficult divorce proceedings, others that I represented, tried to do well by,
made life occasionally better for, for the most part got out of the way of,
as they forged their own lives and moved beyond their mistakes and
lived their lives free of my helping beneficence.
THIRD COMMENT

I want to correct what may have been a misimpression created by

my remarks. If there is any doubt on this score, let me state for the
record and flatly acknowledge that there is and has been racism, bureaucratic indifference and profound error in decisions made by mid-level
public officials. Of course this is so. My point is that, in establishing
lawyer-driven regimes, we've been blind to the downside effects of our
empowerment. Sometimes hypocritically, often innocently, we have at
times created more problems for the people we've purported to help than
those which had existed under lawyer-free regimes.
I see much injustice in not allowing communities to find the
resources within themselves to solve their own problems. I see a decline
of communitarian ethics when distant outsiders assume ultimate decision-making power over community institutions. I see our interventions
as promoting risk-averse rather than creative and accountable public officials, if only because horror and trauma and the sheer time-consuming
character of being sued often penalizes the caring officials who stick
their necks out.
There's also the problem known to all who play the game of telephone. The legal system issues abstract rules of justice that become very
different phenomena in the hands of lower-level legal actors and institutions. However stirring the language of a Supreme Court decision on the
rights of students may be, it's a different matter for the hearing examiner
and school board attorney at Big-City High whose self-interest, as they
see it, is best promoted by telling the principal to leave the troublesome
student alone, to give him a stem warning, to let matters go. The highblown rhetoric of appellate courts often blinds us to what really happens
when the rubber meets the road in the systems we administer. And our
arrogance often blinds us to the fact that the informal justice meted out
by less verbally articulate local officials gets decisions right more often
than we imagine. So I, of course, acknowledge that less lawyered systems make mistakes, sometimes big ones, sometimes venal ones. My
point is that our disempowerment of community leaders, our constitutionalization of anti-communitarian values that define deviancy down
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and treat radical personal individualism as the behavioral norm, our economic illiteracy and our blindness to the devastating effects of perverse
economic incentives has often been desperately tragic for the poor.
Let me also get to your question of how to fund legal services for
the poor, because I do think that poor people ought to have access to
lawyers. I believe that mandatory legal services or reasonable taxes on
lawyer incomes represent a fair quid pro quo for the right to practice law.
In my view, lawyers rather than stenographers and truck drivers should
be taxed to provide the pro bono services we lawyers are ethically mandated to offer to needy clients who can't afford our customary fees. I
also believe that the "free" legal services model of the Legal Services
Corporation has undermined fee-for-service legal clinic models that
would have offered great promise to the poor-with benefits including
greater competition between lawyers, sharp reduction of patronizing
noblesse obligi attitudes on the part of "public interest" rather than
merely fee-paid lawyers, and the greater dignity and control that poor
people would have had if they had been represented by lawyers they
chose and paid for.
In setting up payment and representation systems for poor people,
there's a final issue that needs to be addressed-the need to replicate for
the poor the same sort of limited representation that middle-class clients
have. Contrary to John's views, there's great virtue in such limited representation. When I represented my middle-class clients, there was a meter
running, or a flat fee arrangement that made clear that there was just so
much I was obligated to do. Often, what I was paid to do was less than
what my clients wanted me to do. I couldn't make a federal case out of
every complaint, couldn't fully appeal every adverse ruling, couldn't
always raise complex constitutional issues in every landlord-tenant case I
took on. When I had a client that didn't want to pay the man the two
bucks, I did what I could and often more than I should have done in
terms of my own economic self-interest, but my client was ultimately
constrained in ways that Legal Services clients often are not. And, you
know, my clients were often saved by such limitations. Often, after losing their cases, they actually went on to live their lives, to find different
sources of income, and new bases of esteem after our relationship had
ended.
My concern is to have something that inherently limits the extent to
which lawyers can be used as damn-the-costs instruments of ultimate
client salvation, to have markers that limit the use of clients as nominal
instruments employed by lawyers to fight lawyer-perceived forms of battles for perceived social justice. Merely shifting the tax mode from the
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public to the bar doesn't solve that problem, for if the process of representing clients fails to generate the cost-benefit controls that pricing
mechanisms impose, lawyers and legal systems are certain to get out of
control. The ultimate objective is to give poor people the same limited
access to lawyers, the same let-me-help-solve-your-problem that middleclass people have, rather than the let-me-solve-society's-problems on
which John's vision is based.
FouRTH COMMENT

As we close, it's important to note what John and I agree upon. We
both believe that the condition of the underclass, the growing hopelessness and pathology of urban ghetto life, is a disgrace to our nation.
indeed, we both believe that America won't survive if we don't ameliorate those problems. Not because we'll be done in by the riots John
threatens, but because we will have lost the status that Lincoln once
rightly conferred on us-the last best hope of mankind.
Believing this as I do, I think it particularly strange for John to think
of himself, and those who share his view, as unambivalent if not singular
instruments of dignity and justice for the poor. According to John, if
there's more and yet more money for those who share his view, if there's
more and yet more power given to him and those who share his desire for
lawyers to intervene in resource allocation decisions and public policy
decisions, America's quotient of dignity and justice will go up. It is precisely that kind of moral blindness, precisely our inability as lawyers to
ask the Pogo question of ourselves and to wonder whether the enemy
may not be us, that has caused the American people to increasingly distrust us. Let's look to our own stars. Let's understand that while we
often solve problems, we are powerfully capable of creating as many
problems as we solve-and have often done so. I have a more limited
view of our reach, of what we can do. I have a greater faith in democratic and local community institutions as self-correcting instruments of
social policy. I have a very skeptical notion of people who think they are
God's chosen instruments. It's for those reasons that I believe that it is a
wise American public that has brought about today's crisis of the American legal profession. Unless we change, unless we gain perspective and
humility about who we are and what we can do, we lawyers will become
increasingly marginalized in American society. This will be a sad development, not only for us, but for a society we once brilliantly served.

